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HOW PRIVACY DISTORTED STANDING LAW
Felix T. Wu*
I. INTRODUCTION
Article III standing has emerged as a major barrier to federal court
litigation for plaintiffs who assert a violation of their privacy rights.
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must show a “concrete
and particularized” injury in order to have standing to sue.1  Many
courts, however, have held that a disclosure of personal information
or other loss of privacy, on its own, does not pass this threshold.2
In dismissing privacy claims for lack of Article III standing, courts
have treated the result as merely an application of existing principles
to the new context of digital privacy.3  In reality, such cases represent
a doctrinal shift.  Whereas older standing cases focused on whether
the plaintiff before the court was the right plaintiff, the newer privacy-
based cases are focused on, or making assumptions about, whether or
not the harm caused by the defendant is the right kind of harm.  There
has been a shift from thinking about the nature of the plaintiff to
thinking about the nature of the harm itself.
This doctrinal shift in standing law is deeper than simply a shift in
the injuries the courts recognize as sufficient for standing.  Plaintiffs
have long been able to sue in federal court on the basis of intangible
injuries,4 and the Supreme Court recently affirmed this point explic-
itly.5  Thus, the shift is not from recognizing intangible harms to re-
quiring tangible ones.  The shift is in turning to an inquiry in which the
issue of tangibility even arises in the first place.  Until recently, tangi-
bility and other questions about the quality of the harm suffered by
the plaintiff simply were not part of the Supreme Court’s standing
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
1. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011).
3. See, e.g., id. at 42–43.
4. See Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in Fact in the Infor-
mation Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 752 (2016).
5. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Although tangible injuries are
perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that intangible
injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”).
439
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analysis.6  Lower courts nevertheless incorporated such considerations
into their analyses of standing in privacy cases.  The Supreme Court
has now done the same, thus shifting the law on standing, while pro-
fessing that nothing has changed.7
Doctrinal shifts are not necessarily problematic, of course, but shifts
that occur without awareness or discussion run the risk of being un-
principled.  That has happened here.  The data breach and other simi-
lar cases that precipitated a more robust standing inquiry are ones in
which the separation of powers rationale for Article III standing is at
its weakest.8  At least as applied in these cases, standing law seems to
be serving no purpose other than to constitutionalize a deregulatory
agenda.  Perhaps there are good reasons to expand standing law, but if
so, those reasons, and that expansion, should be made explicit.  Thus
far, the unheralded expansion of standing law is entirely without
justification.
To develop this argument, Part II below describes the Article III
standing inquiry, and in particular, the requirement of an “injury-in-
fact,” as the Supreme Court had developed that analysis.  Part III
shows how the analysis of injury in standing cases has shifted in cases
involving privacy and security, a shift that the Supreme Court itself
made in the Spokeo case,9 and which the lower courts have continued
since Spokeo.10  Finally, Part VI explains why the newly heightened
scrutiny of injuries, far from supporting an appropriate separation of
powers, actually harms an interest in containing the judicial branch to
its proper role.
II. ARTICLE III STANDING AND INJURY IN FACT
The Supreme Court has held that under Article III, the judicial
power of the federal courts extends only to cases and controversies in
which the plaintiff can establish an “irreducible constitutional mini-
6. Where the Court had previously spoken about looking for a “tangible harm,” it appears to
have used the term “tangible” to mean the same thing as “concrete.” See Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (“[Article III standing] requires the litigant to prove that he
has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged con-
duct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.  In other words, for a federal
court to have authority under the Constitution to settle a dispute, the party before it must seek a
remedy for a personal and tangible harm.” (citation omitted) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).  The Court’s use of the term “tangible” in Spokeo must have been
different from its use in Hollingsworth, because in Spokeo, the Court distinguished between
tangibility and concreteness. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
7. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
8. See infra Part VI.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
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mum of standing.”11  Article III standing requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate the following:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an inva-
sion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particu-
larized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical.’”  Second, there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be
“fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party
not before the court.”  Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a
favorable decision.”12
The Supreme Court has treated Article III standing as a trans-sub-
stantive requirement that must be met in every case.13  Defenders of
this view see the doctrine of standing as indispensable to an appropri-
ate separation of powers.14  Standing keeps the federal courts in
check, ensuring that the courts are used only to protect individual
rights and not to decide broad issues that are better left to the legisla-
tive and executive branches.15
Other commentators have argued that standing should be properly
understood as a determination on the merits of whether a particular
plaintiff has a valid cause of action under a particular law.16  That is,
there is no such thing as a trans-substantive restriction on standing,
only restrictions that apply to particular laws.  On this view, judicial
overreach occurs not when courts permit lawsuits to proceed in accor-
dance with the governing law, but when they restrict such lawsuits
through trans-substantive limits of their own making, as if they were
enforcing some kind of substantive due process restriction.17
Under the “substantive” view of standing, legislatures should have
essentially free rein to define standing with respect to causes of action
that they establish.18  Similarly, common law courts can define stand-
ing as part of defining the contours of the common law.  Standing is
thus as much a part of the relevant cause of action as is, say, remedies,
an area clearly within the province of lawmakers, though subject to
11. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
12. Id. at 560–61 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
13. See id. at 561.
14. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separa-
tion of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
15. See id. at 894.
16. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 236 (1988).
17. See id. at 233.
18. See id. at 223–24.
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constitutional due process restrictions.19  The power to define the
cause of action entails the power to determine who may sue to enforce
that cause of action.
The fully substantive view of standing has had little success in the
Supreme Court.20  And yet, in rejecting the fully substantive view, the
Court had, until recently, nevertheless engaged in a form of standing
analysis that was in some ways relatively limited.  In particular, in
evaluating whether a plaintiff has suffered an “injury-in-fact,” the
Court’s analysis had rarely, if ever, focused on the cognizability of the
injury.  The Court permitted a broad range of injuries to satisfy the
injury-in-fact requirement, focusing instead on the question of
whether the particular plaintiff in the case actually suffered (or was
about to suffer) one of those injuries.  In so doing, the Court limited
the class of plaintiffs to those directly affected by the challenged ac-
tion without substantially limiting the types of actions that could serve
as a basis for a lawsuit.  The former inquiry was for the courts, but the
latter could be left to legislatures.
A case like City of Los Angeles v. Lyons21 exemplifies this model.
In Lyons, the Supreme Court denied standing to an individual seeking
to enjoin the Los Angeles Police Department from using chokeholds
in non-life-threatening situations.22  In that case, there was no doubt
that being subjected to a chokehold is a cognizable injury.  The only
question was whether the plaintiff could show any real chance of it
happening to him again in the future.23
Moreover, consider Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife24—often re-
garded as a seminal Supreme Court case on standing—in which the
Court denied standing to individuals who sought to challenge the Sec-
retary of the Interior’s determination that the Endangered Species
19. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“While
States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is well established that there
are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards.  The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary
punishments on a tortfeasor.” (citations omitted)).
20. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009) (“[T]he requirement of
injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”).
21. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
22. Id. at 98, 105.
23. Id. at 108.  The Court held that the fact that the plaintiff had previously been subjected to
the challenged practice gave him standing to seek damages to remedy that past violation, but
was not a basis for standing to enjoin future violations because any future violations were not
any more likely to affect him merely because he had been subjected to the chokehold in the past.
See id.  The four dissenting Justices thought otherwise, arguing that Lyons’ unquestioned stand-
ing to seek damages should suffice to give him standing in the case generally without regard to
the specific forms of relief sought. See id. at 122–23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
24. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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Act does not apply to federal actions taken outside of the United
States.25  Two individuals in particular alleged that they had previously
traveled to specific parts of the world where federally funded projects
could affect endangered species, that they intended to return to those
parts of the world, and that they hoped to see the endangered species
when they next visited those areas.26
In denying standing, the Court perhaps could have questioned
whether an inability to view an endangered species is really an “in-
jury” at all.  Any such injury is purely psychic in nature.27  It involves
no loss of money or property, or even an intangible, but externally
verifiable effect, such as damage to reputation.  The injury exists
largely because the person in question says that it exists.  If anything,
the opportunity to see endangered species is generally one that re-
quires spending money in order to travel to an appropriate location.
If one were to focus on monetary values, perhaps one would regard a
diminished chance of seeing endangered species as a benefit, not a
harm, because it might cause some individuals to cancel their travel
plans and save money.
The Court said none of those things.  Instead, the Court stated, “Of
course, the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely
esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of
standing.”28  The Court denied standing not because it thought the
asserted injury was not cognizable, but because it thought the plain-
tiffs had produced insufficient evidence that the injury would ever
come to pass.29  The plaintiffs had stated only general intentions to
revisit the appropriate areas of the world, and for the Court, “[s]uch
‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or
indeed even any specification of when the some day will be” were not
enough to establish standing.30
The Court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ other theories of standing
similarly accepted various intangible injuries as cognizable, but found
them inapplicable to these plaintiffs.  For example, the Court found it
to be “clear that the person who observes or works with a particular
animal threatened by a federal decision is facing perceptible harm,
25. Id. at 562–63.  Technically, it was a set of wildlife conservation organizations that filed the
lawsuit, but the standing of those organizations depended upon having members with standing to
bring the lawsuit, so the Court focused on the standing of those individual members. See id. at
559, 563.
26. See id. at 563.
27. See Kreimer, supra note 4, at 781. R
28. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63.
29. Id. at 564.
30. Id.
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since the very subject of his interest will no longer exist.”31  The Court
considered that a similar theory might apply even if the threatened
animal was not one specific animal, but rather animals generally in the
place where the person was observing or working.32  The Court re-
fused to extend this theory though to animals that were merely of the
same species as those the person worked with or observed.33  The dis-
tinction is that under the first two theories, the loss of species would
directly affect the person’s observations or work; not so under the
third theory.  Here again, the Court evaluated whether a person’s ob-
servations or work would actually be affected by the loss of species,
without questioning whether any such effects were cognizable
harms.34  Even if effects on one’s work might translate into some kind
of monetary loss, effects on one’s observations seem very unlikely to
result in monetary loss, and yet the Court assumed such effects to be
cognizable.
Case after case repeated the same pattern.  In each, the Supreme
Court based its standing decision not on the cognizability of the plain-
tiff’s harm or whether that harm was of the right type, but rather on
whether the plaintiff had suffered or would suffer that harm.35
The one type of harm that the Court has generally rejected as insuf-
ficient to establish standing is generalized harm that flows merely
from the plaintiff’s status as a citizen.36  One could characterize any
unlawful action as harming an interest in living in a society free of
unlawful actions.  The Court has found this sort of “harm” not to be
cognizable, since such harm always exists and is “generally available”
to all.37  Permitting lawsuits on the basis of such generalized harm
would be tantamount to eliminating restrictions on standing alto-
31. Id. at 566.
32. Id. at 566–67.
33. Id. at 567.
34. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566–67.
35. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009) (“While generalized harm
to the forest or the environment will not alone support standing, if that harm in fact affects the
recreational or even the mere esthetic interests of the plaintiff, that will suffice.”); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (“We have held that
environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the af-
fected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be
lessened’ by the challenged activity.”).
36. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more di-
rectly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III
case or controversy.”).
37. Id.
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gether.38  As a result, the Court has refused to recognize “an abstract,
self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe
the procedures required by law.”39
The Court’s refusal to confer standing on the basis of generalized
harms stemming from the very existence of unlawful conduct explains
its analysis in a case like Laird v. Tatum.40  In Laird, the plaintiffs sued
to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief against the U.S. Army’s “al-
leged surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activity,”
which the plaintiffs claimed violated their First Amendment rights.41
The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to “present[ ] a justiciable
controversy,” by failing to allege any “actual present or immediately
threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action.”42  In
so doing, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that they were injured
because the government surveillance created a chilling effect on their
expressive activities.43  The Court did not, however, base its holding
on the idea that a chilling effect was not a cognizable harm; to the
contrary, the Court had previously recognized chilling effects as being
an appropriate basis for a First Amendment suit.44  The problem for
the plaintiffs in Laird was that the alleged chilling effect was one that
resulted from “the very existence of the Army’s data-gathering sys-
tem,” rather than any particular use of the system against them.45
This form of chilling effect was thus one shared by society at large,
rather than being specific to these plaintiffs.  Where, on the contrary,
the alleged harm is sufficiently specific to the plaintiffs, the Court had
rarely, if ever, questioned the nature of that harm.
Moreover, the need to avoid suits based on generalized harm also
explains the Court’s longstanding caveat that while Congress can cre-
ate standing, its ability to do so has limits.  The Court has long held
38. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982) (“[A]ssertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct,
which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements
of Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning.”).
39. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753–54 (1984) (rejecting as
not judicially cognizable both “a claim simply to have the Government avoid the violation of law
alleged in respondents’ complaint” and “a claim of stigmatic injury, or denigration, suffered by
all members of a racial group when the Government discriminates on the basis of race”).  Con-
versely, though, in some cases involving relatively generalized harm, the Court has nevertheless
permitted standing, as in recognizing taxpayer standing to challenge government expenditures as
a violation of the Establishment Clause. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968).
40. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
41. Id. at 2–3.
42. Id. at 3, 15.
43. See id. at 13.
44. See id. at 11–12.
45. Id. at 13.
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that “Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the
statute.”46  At the same time, the Court has cautioned that “the re-
quirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction
that cannot be removed by statute.”47  The latter principle has now
been used by the Court to support scrutiny of statutorily defined
harms.48  That was not the context, however, in which the principle
was originally stated.  In Summers, for example, the Court immedi-
ately elaborated on the need for the “hard floor” by explaining that it
was necessary in order to avoid Congress authorizing “citizen suits to
vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administra-
tion of the laws.”49  It was only this injury to such a “nonconcrete
interest in the proper administration of the laws,” whether recognized
in a statute or not, that the Court found to be insufficient for standing.
Other statutorily defined injuries went unquestioned.
III. STANDING IN PRIVACY CASES
In analyzing standing in a privacy case, the Supreme Court had, un-
til recently, continued this pattern of focusing on whether the plaintiff
was affected, rather than on the nature of the effects.  In Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA,50 the Court denied standing to a group of
plaintiffs seeking to challenge the constitutionality of surveillance au-
thorized under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA).51  The crux of the problem for the plaintiffs was that they
were unable to show that their particular communications would actu-
ally be acquired by the government through a section 702 order.52  In
the absence of any information about who the government targets
under this program (information that the government obviously tries
to keep secret), the Court deemed the plaintiffs’ assertions that their
communications would be targeted to be “highly speculative.”53
Implicit in the Court’s reasoning in Clapper is that if the plaintiffs
had been able to show that their communications had been acquired,
46. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
47. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009).
48. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Article III standing requires a
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”).
49. Summers, 555 U.S. at 497 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at
577 (refusing “[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts”).
50. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
51. Id. at 1143.
52. See id. at 1148.
53. Id.
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then that acquisition would have been a sufficient injury for standing
purposes.  The Court traced a chain of inferences that underlie the
plaintiffs’ argument for standing, starting with the government
“decid[ing] to target the communications of non-U.S. persons with
whom [the plaintiffs] communicate” and ending with the plaintiffs be-
ing “parties to the particular communications that the Government
intercepts.”54  At no point did the Court suggest that perhaps even the
interception would not be enough.55
It is true that the Court in Clapper did find one kind of harm not to
be cognizable—namely, the plaintiffs’ “fear of surveillance” and the
steps the plaintiffs took in response to that fear.56  In the absence of
information about how the government chooses surveillance targets,
however, that fear arises from the existence of the program itself,
rather than anything the government has actually done under the pro-
gram.  In theory that fear could be equally applicable to anyone.
Thus, as in Laird, the Court’s refusal to recognize such fears can be
understood as a version of its refusal to recognize generalized harms.57
To be sure, perhaps the Court should have been more willing to ac-
knowledge what everyone knows: Government surveillance programs
are more likely to target some kinds of communications than others.58
Moreover, perhaps the unique dangers of surveillance warrant a rule
in which broadly shared chilling effects ought to suffice to establish
standing.59  The point here is that even if Clapper was wrongly de-
cided, it did not represent a sharp departure from the Court’s prior
standing law.
In contrast, lower courts deciding privacy cases began to shift the
standing inquiry in a more substantial way, toward an evaluation of
whether certain harms are cognizable and away from primarily deter-
mining whether those harms have occurred or will occur to the plain-
tiff.  For example, in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,60 an unknown hacker
infiltrated the defendant’s computer systems and potentially gained
access to the plaintiffs’ personal information, including social security
numbers, dates of birth, and bank account information.61  The plain-
54. Id.
55. See id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“No one here denies that the Government’s inter-
ception of a private telephone or e-mail conversation amounts to an injury that is ‘concrete and
particularized.’”).
56. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151.
57. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972).
58. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1157–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1963–64
(2013).
60. 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).
61. See id. at 40.
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tiffs sued, asserting a number of state common law and statutory
causes of action.  The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked Arti-
cle III standing because they had made only “allegations of hypotheti-
cal, future injury,” which were “insufficient.”62
In justifying its conclusion, the court in Reilly cited Lyons and Lu-
jan and described a chain of inappropriately speculative inferences
that plaintiffs needed to make in order to allege harm, much as in
Clapper.63  But whereas the Clapper chain ended with the govern-
ment’s acquisition of the plaintiffs’ communications, the chain in
Reilly started with the unauthorized acquisition and ended with the
use of “such information to the detriment of Appellants by making
unauthorized transactions in Appellants’ names.”64  In other words,
the court assumed that the mere acquisition of personal information
was not a cognizable injury and that instead, unauthorized use was
required to establish Article III standing.
That assumption represents a significant shift from the cases that
the Third Circuit relied upon in its opinion.  As described above, in
Lyons, there was no question that being subjected to a chokehold was
a cognizable injury, and in Lujan, the Court assumed that merely be-
ing unable to view an endangered species was a cognizable injury.
The other two cases relied upon in Reilly were not any more helpful to
its conclusion.  In Whitmore v. Arkansas,65 the Supreme Court denied
the standing of one capital defendant to challenge the death sentence
of another.66  In that case, no one could question the significance of
the harms that were at stake.  Similarly, Storino v. Borough of Point
Pleasant Beach67 involved a zoning dispute in which all sides seemed
to agree that the relevant interests were real property interests.68
None of those cases provide any precedent for viewing the unautho-
rized acquisition of personal information as not a cognizable harm.
The Third Circuit in Reilly further asserted that “[i]n data breach
cases where no misuse is alleged, . . . there has been no injury—in-
deed, no change in the status quo.”69  The court then used this asser-
tion to distinguish cases involving medical malpractice or toxic torts.70
If intended as a factual claim, the assertion is surely false.  The status
62. Id. at 42.
63. Id. at 42–43.
64. Id. at 42.
65. 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
66. See id. at 151.
67. 322 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2003).
68. See id. at 295.
69. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 45.
70. Id.
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quo has changed because some unauthorized individual now has ac-
cess to information that he or she previously did not have access to.
To make sense of the assertion, one must read it as a legal conclusion:
There has been no change in any status quo that the law recognizes.
The opinion in Reilly, however, did little to defend such a novel
conclusion.
The opinion did no better at justifying its assumption that, unlike an
environmental case, the interests at stake in this case were purely
“monetary,” and thus easily compensable after the fact.71  A broad
array of commentators have catalogued the ways in which privacy is
about much more than money.72  Whether or not those arguments are
applicable in this context, what is striking here is that the court’s anal-
ysis hinged on a characterization of the relevant interests—a charac-
terization that the Supreme Court did not engage in when deciding
cases like Lujan.
Nor does a case like Reilly fit into the paradigm of courts rejecting
harms as too generalized.  The plaintiffs in data breach cases are the
ones whose data has been breached.  They are suing because they are
directly affected by whatever unlawful actions led to the breach and
not merely because they are citizens asserting a right to live in a soci-
ety free of unlawful actions.  The harms they are asserting are individ-
ual harms, not societal ones.  This remains true even in contexts in
which large databases are amassed or breached, and thus many indi-
viduals are affected.73
The phenomenon of courts scrutinizing harms in privacy cases is not
limited to ones involving data breaches, but extends to other types of
privacy cases as well.  For example, in In re Google, Inc. Privacy Pol-
icy Litigation,74 plaintiffs challenged Google’s decision to consolidate
personal data across multiple products.75  In partially dismissing the
complaint for lack of Article III standing, the court explained that
injury-in-fact in this context requires more than an allegation that a
defendant profited from a plaintiff’s personal identification infor-
mation.  Rather, a plaintiff must allege how the defendant’s use of
the information deprived the plaintiff of the information’s economic
value.  Put another way, a plaintiff must do more than point to the
71. Id. at 45–46.
72. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1904–05 (2013).
73. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992) (distinguishing “a case where
concrete injury has been suffered by many persons, as in mass fraud or mass tort situations”).
74. No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3. 2013).
75. See id. at *5–6.
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dollars in a defendant’s pocket; he must sufficient[ly] allege that in
the process he lost dollars of his own.76
Again, the court’s holding is premised on the assumption that in-
jury-in-fact means monetary loss, and that at a minimum, courts
should scrutinize the nature of plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.  Such an as-
sumption seems to have developed in privacy cases, despite being in-
consistent with the Supreme Court’s foundational standing cases.
Indeed, the court in the Google Privacy Policy case explicitly noted,
First, despite generating little or no discussion in most other cases,
the issue of injury-in-fact has become standard fare in cases involv-
ing data privacy.  In fact, the court is hard-pressed to find even one
recent data privacy case, at least in this district, in which injury-in-
fact has not been challenged.  Second, in this district’s recent case
law on data privacy claims, injury-in-fact has proven to be a signifi-
cant barrier to entry.  And so even though injury-in-fact may not
generally be Mount Everest, as then-Judge Alito observed, in data
privacy cases in the Northern District of California, the doctrine
might still reasonably be described as Kilimanjaro.77
This privacy exceptionalism is perhaps unsurprising.  Privacy has
long had a public relations problem.78  While direct monetary and
physical harms that flow from privacy violations are concrete and pal-
pable,79 other more subtle and structural harms are far less so.80  In
this context, Article III standing may appear to be a straightforward
and expedient way to dispose of apparently unmeritorious lawsuits in
which the plaintiffs have not “really” been harmed.81  By using stand-
ing doctrine for this purpose though, courts are not only adopting a
particular perspective on the nature and value of privacy, they are
shifting the law on standing to one that allows courts to dismiss claims
on the basis of their views on the nature and value of the asserted
harms.  That shift will have effects far beyond the privacy cases that
precipitated it.
To be sure, reversing the trend and broadly recognizing injuries for
standing purposes may not make much difference to the outcomes of
76. Id. at *15.
77. Id. at *13–14.
78. See Cohen, supra note 72, at 1904. R
79. See, e.g., Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003) (involving claims
against an information broker that disclosed a woman’s work address to a stalker who used that
information to find and murder her).
80. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1147 (2015).
81. See Eric Goldman, Flash Cookies Lawsuit Tossed for Lack of Harm–La Court v. Specific
Media, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (May 4, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/05/
flash_cookies_l.htm (“I still think Article III standing is the best way to get rid of the junk
privacy lawsuits, so I am happy when courts embrace the doctrine to end unmeritorious cases
early.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL212.txt unknown Seq: 13  7-JUL-17 10:47
2017] HOW PRIVACY DISTORTED STANDING LAW 451
many privacy cases.  This is because a showing of damages is required
as an element of many of the substantive claims brought in privacy
and security cases, and “injury-in-fact” sufficient for standing may not
be sufficient to show “damages” in the underlying claim.  Thus, for
example, in the Ninth Circuit, which has often adopted relatively per-
missive standing rules, data breach plaintiffs have just as often failed
on the merits, even after surpassing the standing hurdle.82
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish properly between re-
jecting the plaintiff’s claim on the merits and rejecting it for want of
Article III standing.  The former is a legislative matter, while the latter
is a judicial one.  When the underlying cause of action is based in state
common law, the merits question is ultimately one for the state com-
mon law courts.  Similarly, when the cause of action is a statutory one,
the merits question is a matter of statutory interpretation.  Article III
standing is a constitutional question on which the federal courts have
the last say and which is ultimately not a matter of statutory interpre-
tation, at least as the Supreme Court has conceived of the doctrine.83
Thus, plaintiffs whose state law claims fail on the merits can seek to
change the law through state courts or through legislatures, while
plaintiffs whose claims fail on Article III standing grounds cannot
seek to change the law in the same way.  Using Article III standing as
a substitute for a merits determination shifts the locus of control over
the development of the law.
IV. THE SHIFT COMPLETED: SPOKEO, INC. V. ROBINS
The doctrinal shift in standing law toward evaluating the
cognizability of harms has now been completed by the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.84  The question in
Spokeo was whether the plaintiff Robins had standing to sue Spokeo
for disseminating false information about him, allegedly in violation of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act.85  The Ninth Circuit, focusing on the
fact that it was Robins’ information that had been disseminated, found
82. See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
plaintiffs had Article III standing); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App’x 129, 130–31 (9th
Cir. 2010) (holding in a separate, unpublished memorandum that the same plaintiffs failed on
the merits of their state-law claims); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634, 640 (7th
Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were “sufficient to confer Article III stand-
ing,” but were “not compensable as a matter of Indiana law”).
83. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Article III standing requires a
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”).
84. Id. at 1540.
85. See id. at 1546.
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that he had standing.86  The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision, holding that the requirement of a “concrete and partic-
ularized” injury means that there are separate requirements of
concreteness and particularization, and that the Ninth Circuit had
erred by failing to consider the concreteness of the asserted harm.87
In establishing a free-standing concreteness requirement, the Su-
preme Court has now added a new hurdle to standing, much as the
lower courts had done in cases like Reilly.  The question is no longer
simply whether an unlawful act has affected or may affect the plaintiff.
The question is whether that effect counts as a “real harm.”88  An-
swering this question requires the courts to assess the nature and
cognizability of harms in a way that the Supreme Court had not been
doing before.
And yet, the Supreme Court claimed to be doing nothing new.  It
treated as a well-established proposition that concreteness and partic-
ularization are separate requirements, stating that “[w]e have made it
clear time and time again that an injury in fact must be both concrete
and particularized.”89  Despite the insistent, almost impatient-sound-
ing language, this claim turns out to be utterly without support.  The
Court cited four cases for this “clear” rule.90  In none of those four
cases did the Court engage in a separate concreteness analysis or oth-
erwise assess the cognizability of the asserted harm.91
For example, in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,92 the question
was whether a political advocacy organization had standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of an Ohio law that criminalized making
certain false statements about a political candidate, even though the
candidate in question had already lost the election and withdrawn his
complaint.93  The lower courts denied standing, finding that it was not
sufficiently likely that the organization would be prosecuted under the
law in a future election cycle.94  The Supreme Court reversed, finding
86. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1540.
87. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545.
88. See id. at 1549.
89. Id. at 1548.
90. See id. (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014); Summers v.
Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009); Sprint Comm’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S.
269, 274 (2008); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007)).
91. See id. at 1555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the four cases cited by the Court, and many
others, opinions do not discuss the separate offices of the terms ‘concrete’ and
‘particularized.’”).
92. 134 S. Ct. 2334.
93. See id. at 2340.
94. See id. at 2340–41.
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that the organization was subject to a “‘credible threat’ of
enforcement.”95
The Court’s analysis in Susan B. Anthony List was exactly the sort
of analysis that it has consistently engaged in.  Criminal prosecution is
clearly a cognizable harm.  The question in the case was not whether
the harm was “real” enough.  The question was simply whether or not
the harm would be likely to occur to the plaintiff in the future.
Similarly, in Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.,96
the issue was whether assignees had standing to pursue legal claims
that had been assigned to them, when the assignment provided that
any money recovered in pursuing the claims would be paid back to the
assignors.97  Again, there was no question about the nature of the
harm, which was monetary.  The only question was whether the as-
signees, and not just the assignors, could be said to have suffered that
harm.  In the end, the Court found that the assignees did have
standing.98
Finally, Summers v. Earth Island Institute99 and Massachusetts v.
EPA100 were both environmental cases in which the Court accepted
that environmental harms are real harms.101  In Summers, the Court
denied standing because “[t]here may be a chance, but is hardly a like-
lihood, that [the plaintiff organization’s member’s] wanderings will
bring him to a parcel about to be affected by a project unlawfully sub-
ject to the regulations.”102  In other words, as in Lujan, the problem
was not the nature of the harm, but whether the harm would in fact
affect the plaintiff.  In Massachusetts, the Court granted standing to
the state of Massachusetts because a failure to address climate change
would have negative effects on coastal land, including coastal land lo-
cated within the state.103
In all four cases, the Court’s analysis focused on whether the plain-
tiff would suffer the alleged harm, not whether the type of harm was
the right kind of harm.  In three of the four cases, the Court ultimately
found that the plaintiffs did have standing.  In none of the cases did
95. Id. at 2343 (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 15 (2010)).
96. 554 U.S. 269 (2008).
97. See id. at 274.
98. See id. at 275.
99. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
100. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
101. See Summers, 555 U.S. at 494 (“While generalized harm to the forest or the environment
will not alone support standing, if that harm in fact affects the recreational or even the mere
esthetic interests of the plaintiff, that will suffice.”); Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521 (“The harms
associated with climate change are serious and well recognized.”).
102. Summers, 555 U.S. at 495.
103. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522.
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the Court purport to explain the meaning of the requirement that the
injury be “concrete and particularized,” and certainly in none of the
cases did the Court “make it clear” that these are two separate
requirements.104
Beyond the attempt to invoke precedent, the Spokeo Court looked
to the dictionary definition of “concrete,”105 and the Court seemed
also to invoke something like a canon against surplusage, suggesting
that the words “concrete” and “particularized” in the test for Article
III standing surely could not mean the same thing.106  These, however,
are tools of statutory construction,107 and they are entirely misplaced
here because the phrase “concrete and particularized” is not statutory
language, but rather language invented by the Court itself.  Indeed,
the phrase was first used by the Supreme Court in Lujan,108 and as we
have seen, that case provides no support for scrutinizing the nature of
the alleged harm.109
A more reasonable basis for interpreting the word “concrete” in the
standing inquiry is to look to how the Supreme Court has previously
used the word in this context.  In fact, the Court has used the word to
mean several different things, but none of them involve an inquiry
into the reality of the harm, as the Court did in Spokeo.  Sometimes
the Court has spoken about how the standing doctrine is necessary “to
104. Earlier in the Spokeo opinion, the Court also wrote: “As we have explained in our prior
opinions, the injury-in-fact requirement requires a plaintiff to allege an injury that is both ‘con-
crete and particularized.’” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)).  The emphasis on “and,” how-
ever, was added by the Spokeo Court.  The quoted passage from the Friends of the Earth case
simply quoted the test for standing as stated in Lujan, and did not purport to focus on the phrase
“concrete and particularized,” let alone the words “concrete” and “particularized” as separate
requirements. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180–81.  Indeed, far from imposing any
separate concreteness requirement, the court in Friends of the Earth ultimately found standing
on the basis that the organization’s members lived near the allegedly polluted river and that their
“recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests” would be affected. Id. at 181–84.
105. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
106. See id. (“Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact, but it is not sufficient.
An injury in fact must also be ‘concrete.’ Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, however, that inde-
pendent requirement was elided.”).
107. On the canon against surplusage, see, for example, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995) (“A reluctance to treat statutory terms as sur-
plusage supports the reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation.” (emphasis added)).
108. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  The phrase “concrete and partic-
ularized” appears in one Supreme Court case predates Lujan, but only in passing. See Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envt’l Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80–81 (1978) (“Where a party cham-
pions his own rights, and where the injury alleged is a concrete and particularized one which will
be prevented or redressed by the relief requested, the basic practical and prudential concerns
underlying the standing doctrine are generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are
met.”).
109. See supra notes 24–34 and accompanying text. R
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assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends.”110  In this context,
concreteness refers to the nature of the case as a whole, rather than
the nature of the alleged harm.
More commonly, the Court has used “concrete” as the opposite of
“abstract,” and it has contrasted a concrete harm with “an abstract,
self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe
the procedures required by law.”111  In other words, the concreteness
requirement has been used only to reject injuries that flow solely from
the very fact of unlawful action, untied to a particular effect on the
plaintiff.  In that sense, “concrete and particularized” refers to a single
concept, not two separate ones.  Scalia himself referred to a “concrete
injury” as “an injury apart from the mere breach of the social contract,
so to speak, effected by the very fact of unlawful government ac-
tion.”112  Concreteness has not been thought to require an assessment
of the nature and value of effects directed at the plaintiff.
V. CASES FOLLOWING SPOKEO
In implementing the Spokeo decision, lower courts have continued
to scrutinize the harms claimed by plaintiffs and to reject at least some
privacy harms as insufficiently “concrete” to support standing.  For ex-
ample, in a pair of cases, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits each re-
jected as insufficient for standing the unlawful retention of customer
data by cable companies, in violation of the Cable Communications
Policy Act.113  In doing so, each court suggested that while unlawful
disclosure or unlawful use of the data might be a concrete injury, un-
lawful retention was not.114  According to the court in Gubala v. Time
110. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
111. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573.
112. Scalia, supra note 14, at 895. R
113. See Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 2017); Braitberg v.
Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016).
114. See Gubala, 846 F.3d at 910 (“But the plaintiff has not alleged that Time Warner has ever
given away or leaked or lost any of his personal information or intends to give it away or is at
risk of having the information stolen from it. . . .  The district judge was right, in these circum-
stances, to rule that the plaintiff does not have standing to sue.”); Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 930
(“With the benefit of Spokeo’s guidance, we conclude that Braitberg has not alleged an injury in
fact as required by Article III. . . .  He does not allege that Charter has disclosed the information
to a third party, that any outside party has accessed the data, or that Charter has used the infor-
mation in any way during the disputed period.”).  In Gubala, some language suggests that per-
haps even disclosure would not be sufficiently concrete absent some further economic or other
harm. See Gubala, 846 F.3d at 910–11 (noting that the plaintiff had presented no evidence “that
in the decade since he subscribed to Time Warner’s residential services any of the personal infor-
mation that he supplied to the company when he subscribed had leaked and caused financial or
other injury to him or had even been at risk of being leaked” (emphasis added)).
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Warner Cable, Inc.,115 “there is no indication of any violation of the
plaintiff’s privacy because there is no indication that Time Warner has
released, or allowed anyone to disseminate, any of the plaintiff’s per-
sonal information in the company’s possession.”116  Such a judgment
about what “counts” as a privacy violation is precisely the sort of judg-
ment that the Supreme Court’s pre-Spokeo cases avoided but that the
Spokeo decision invites.
Indeed, the new focus on the nature of the plaintiff’s harm poten-
tially comes at the expense of the prior focus on whether the plaintiff
was personally affected.  In Gubala, the court wrote that “Gubala can
no more sue than someone who, though he has never subscribed and
means never to subscribe to a cable company, nevertheless is outraged
by the thought that Time Warner and perhaps other cable companies
are violating a federal statute with apparent impunity.”117  In other
words, the court cast the plaintiffs in the case as being in the same
situation as plaintiffs who sue on the basis of an abstract, generalized
harm that applies equally to everyone in society.  The court effectively
treated as insignificant the fact that the plaintiffs in the case were su-
ing on the basis of their information having been retained and not
someone else’s information—precisely the sort of fact that was of cru-
cial significance in cases like Lujan.
Similarly, in Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc.,118 the D.C. Circuit
held that unlawfully collecting zip codes did not give rise to a suffi-
ciently concrete injury for Article III standing.119  As in the cable
cases above, the court required some further “concrete consequence,”
such as “invasion of privacy, increased risk of fraud or identity theft,
or pecuniary or emotional injury,” in order to satisfy standing require-
ments.120  Here again the court made a judgment about whether the
plaintiffs’ alleged privacy harm was sufficiently “real” or not.
Further, post-Spokeo scrutiny of harms is not limited to privacy
cases.  In Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Insurance Fund,121 for example,
the Sixth Circuit denied standing to plaintiffs who sued their group
health plan under Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ER-
ISA) for failing to remove benefit caps as mandated by the Affordable
Care Act.122  The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege a
115. 846 F.3d 909.
116. Id. at 912.
117. Id. at 911–12.
118. 830 F.3d 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
119. See id. at 512.
120. Id. at 514.
121. 844 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2016).
122. See id. at 579–80.
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sufficiently concrete injury, focusing on the “extreme generality” with
which the plaintiffs had alleged “that certain members of their class
suffer from conditions that have previously required medical expenses
in excess of the benefit caps imposed by the Plan” or “that some of
their employees will choose to delay important medical procedures in
order to avoid exceeding the cap.”123  In focusing on employees actu-
ally bumping up against the cap, the court seems to have missed the
idea that insurance is a hedge against risk, that insurance with a cap is
not as good of a hedge as insurance without a cap, and that being
subjected to a greater future risk is very much a present harm.
To be sure, the lower courts are sometimes finding even alleged pri-
vacy harms to be sufficiently concrete to confer standing, particularly
given the Supreme Court’s admonition that “concrete” does not nec-
essarily mean tangible.124  For example, the Third Circuit recently
held that improper disclosure of personal information could be a con-
crete injury even without any evidence that the information had been,
or was about to be, misused.125  Even where the courts are finding
injuries to be sufficiently concrete, however, they are engaging in a
much more searching analysis to do so.126  That sort of analysis is new.
VI. THE MISMATCH BETWEEN THEORY AND DOCTRINE
The doctrinal shift made by the Court in Spokeo might be less
troublesome if it were theoretically justified, but it is not.  Defenders
of a particularly robust standing doctrine have generally invoked sepa-
ration of powers concerns.127  And yet those concerns are largely ab-
sent in the privacy cases in which standing has become a particularly
high hurdle.
Courts have not been clear about precisely what they mean in say-
ing that standing serves the goal of separation of powers,128 but the
basic idea seems to be to distinguish between resolving individual dis-
putes—the province of courts—and resolving social policy ques-
tions—the province of the political branches.  In Lujan, for example,
the court wrote:
123. Id. at 582.
124. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
125. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 629 (3d Cir.
2017).
126. See, e.g., id. at 638–39 (relying at least in part on an analogy to common law privacy torts
in finding an unauthorized disclosure of information to be a concrete injury).
127. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a
single basic idea – the idea of separation of powers.”); Scalia, supra note 14, at 881. R
128. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 460–63 (2008).
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Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of
Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in
our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the
separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch—one
of the essential elements that identifies those “Cases” and “Contro-
versies” that are the business of the courts rather than of the politi-
cal branches.  “The province of the court,” as Chief Justice Marshall
said in Marbury v. Madison, “is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals.”  Vindicating the public interest (including the public
interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is
the function of Congress and the Chief Executive.129
The vast majority of privacy and security cases, though, are indeed
ones involving individual rights, not merely broad questions of public
interest.  Almost invariably, privacy plaintiffs are specific individuals
who claim that their own personal information has been mishandled
in some way.130  That mishandling then provides the factual basis for
their legal claims under statutory or common law.
When courts deny standing in these cases on the basis of the injuries
being insufficiently concrete, they are not deciding whether the cases
are ones that concern individual rights, but rather deciding the sub-
stantive content of those rights.  Far from supporting an appropriate
separation of powers, this move amounts to a usurpation of legislative
power by the federal judiciary.131
Consider again the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Gubala, finding the
unlawful retention of data to be an insufficiently concrete injury.132
The court supported its holding by claiming that “otherwise the fed-
eral courts would be flooded with cases based not on proof of harm
but on an implausible and at worst trivial risk of harm.”133  But where
did the court get the authority to reject the case for fear of being
“flooded”?  Such a judgment is a quintessentially legislative one.
Surely the federal courts could not, on their own accord, decide that
they were being flooded with trivial class action cases and thereby im-
pose some additional requirements on class actions, something that
Congress of course can do (and has done).134  Similarly, common law
129. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (citation omitted) (quoting Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803)).
130. See, e.g., Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 910 (7th Cir. 2017).
131. See Daniel Townsend, Who Should Define Injuries for Article III Standing?, 68 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 76, 81 (2015) (arguing that judicial review of statutorily created injuries requires
the Court “to come up with a way to acknowledge the socially defined nature of injuries while
simultaneously overriding society’s most significant deliberative body”).
132. See Gubala, 846 F.3d at 911.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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courts often take into account the potential for a flood of cases in
deciding whether to recognize new causes of action135 or how far to
extend certain duties.136  But the federal courts are not common law
courts.  Under the Constitution, Congress gets to decide whether or
not to flood the federal courts.137  For the federal courts to make this
decision is to upend the constitutional order.
Similarly, the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Spokeo to look to “his-
tory” and the common law in defining concrete injuries,138 a sugges-
tion taken up by the lower courts,139 also undermines the role of
legislatures.  It is the legislature’s prerogative to supersede the com-
mon law if it so chooses.140  There is no reason why the legislature
should be limited to recognizing only those injuries recognized at
common law.
Moreover, scrutiny of harms undermines the legislature’s ability to
act to prevent harms proactively, rather than only addressing com-
pleted harms.  For example, the D.C. Circuit’s judgment that the col-
lection of zip codes causes no “concrete consequence”141 is at odds
with the judgment of state legislatures, confirmed by state courts, that
collecting zip codes can lead to consumer privacy harms, such as re-
ceiving unwanted marketing or the sale of personal information to
third parties.142  To be sure, the Court in Spokeo was careful to cau-
tion that a “risk of real harm” could be sufficiently concrete.143  The
overall concreteness inquiry, though, invites courts to substitute their
judgments of risk for that of legislatures, again usurping the legislative
role.
135. See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902) (declining
to recognize a common law right of privacy in New York at least in part because it would “neces-
sarily result, not only in a vast amount of litigation, but in litigation bordering upon the absurd”).
136. See, e.g., 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097,
1101 (N.Y. 2001) (declining to impose a duty owed to those who suffered purely economic losses
in order to “avoid exposing defendants to unlimited liability to an indeterminate class of persons
conceivably injured by any negligence in a defendant’s act”).
137. See Toby J. Stern, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 377, 399 (2003).
138. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
139. See, e.g., Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding
the retention of data not to be a concrete harm at least in part because “[a]lthough there is a
common law tradition of lawsuits for invasion of privacy, the retention of information lawfully
obtained, without further disclosure, traditionally has not provided the basis for a lawsuit in
American courts”).
140. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2015) (superseding Roberson and
establishing a statutory right of privacy in New York).
141. Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
142. See Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737, 746 (Mass. 2013); Pineda v. Williams-
Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612, 619 (Cal. 2011).
143. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
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An overly expansive standing inquiry is particularly problematic in
the context of suits against private companies, as most data breach
and other privacy cases are.144  The paradigmatic standing case for
someone like Scalia is a lawsuit challenging the validity of government
action.145  If in such a case, the challenged government action affects
the citizenry generally, rather than specific individuals, then the pre-
ferred recourse for those who disagree with the action is to directly
undo it through the legislative and executive branches.146  In Lujan,
for example, Scalia presumably would have told those dissatisfied with
the Secretary of the Interior’s rule to work to elect a new President,
who would choose a new Secretary of the Interior, who would pro-
mulgate a new rule.  Or Scalia might have advised them to advocate
Congress to pass new legislation overruling the Secretary’s rule.  Ei-
ther of those courses of action would have been preferable to suing
the Secretary and seeking a judicial determination that would force
the Secretary to change the rule.
In the case of a private actor, there is no corresponding ability to
use the political process to directly halt the actor’s challenged activity.
Some form of government action will be necessary.  Denying standing
on the basis of the plaintiff being the wrong plaintiff would still leave
the door open to other potential plaintiffs.  Denying standing on the
basis of the harm being the wrong kind of harm essentially takes pri-
vate lawsuits in federal courts out of the picture entirely.  While the
possibility of purely executive or administrative action would remain,
such a rule can severely hamper the government’s ability to regulate
the challenged activity by removing an important tool from the regu-
latory toolbox.
If government power against private parties is limited by standing
doctrine, then the doctrine may be serving deregulatory goals, rather
than separation of powers ones.  Standing becomes a means by which
politically desirable regulation is struck down by the courts.  Whatever
the merits of a deregulatory agenda, that agenda should be estab-
lished, if at all, through the political process.  Constitutionalizing der-
144. See id. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[Standing] limitations preserve separation of
powers by preventing the judiciary’s entanglement in disputes that are primarily political in na-
ture.  This concern is generally absent when a private plaintiff seeks to enforce only his personal
rights against another private party.”); see also F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and
Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 277 (2008).
145. See Scalia, supra note 14, at 895 (“[T]he doctrine of standing, as applied to challenges to R
governmental action, is an essential means of restricting the courts to their assigned role of pro-
tecting minority rather than majority interests.” (emphasis added)).
146. See id. at 894–95.
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egulation is unwarranted and unjustified.147  And yet, that is what a
standing doctrine that requires scrutiny of harms invites.
VII. CONCLUSION
There has been a subtle but important shift in standing doctrine.
Where the Supreme Court once deferred to Congress and common
law courts to define cognizable harms, it has now taken upon itself,
particularly in privacy or information cases, to have some say in defin-
ing harms.  While the Court has at least signaled that its review will
not be as stringent as it could be, the exercise itself is unprecedented,
unprincipled, and can only lead to mischief.  Many of the privacy cases
being eliminated on standing grounds are actually meritorious, but
even if they were not, that judgment is not one for federal courts to
make.
147. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But a consti-
tution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”).
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